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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 22, 2013, President Barack Obama challenged the structure and 
quality of higher education by proposing an education reform plan which would 
result in what he called a “shakeup” for colleges and universities.
1
 While the plan’s 
ostensible purpose is to make college a more affordable, better bargain for the mid-
dle class, in reality the plan proposes sweeping educational reforms.
2
 The plan mir-
rors other education legislation
3
 plans by requiring greater collegiate accountability 




 1. Press Release, Remarks by the President on College Affordability, Syracuse NY, WHITE 
HOUSE (Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/22/remarks-
president-college-affordability-syracuse-ny. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified 
as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (2006)).  
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and efficiency, as well as increased use of technology and innovative teaching 
methods.
4
 Tuition, policies, and programs will all be ranked by the Department of 
Education and will be used to determine federal funding for institutions.
5
 In the 
proposal, students will be held accountable for loan money through required course 




The suggestion that higher education is in crisis and is in need of reform is by 
no means a new concept.
7
 Higher education has been increasingly criticized in re-
cent years by reformers from both the public and private arena, with the increasing 
price of college tuition as one of the main drivers.
8
 Not surprisingly, as state and 
federal funding for higher education has increased, there has been a corresponding 
demand for greater accountability on the part of higher education institutions.
9
 Ed-
ucational reform has become a consumer-driven issue and new legislation, whether 
for elementary and secondary schools or for colleges and universities, appears to 
prefer a business model, rather than a more traditional, non-profit model.
10
 These 
recent trends in higher education restructuring are moving higher education from 
peer accountability to a political and market accountability model, in order to drive 
tuition rates down and increase access.
11
 




                                                          
 
 4. Here’s the Plan to Make College More Affordable, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http:www.whitehouse.gov/share/make-college-affordable. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.; Scott Jaschik, Obama’s Ratings for Higher Ed, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 22, 
2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/22/president-obama-proposes-link-student-aid-new-
ratings-colleges. 
 7. Elizabeth Lunday, Assessing and Forecasting Facilities in Higher Education, APPA 
THOUGHT LEADERS SERIES, 3 (2010), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED517059.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 13 (demonstrating that by 2010, public “college tuition and fees ha[d] risen . . . 440 
percent” since 1985). 
 9. See generally Simon Marginson & Gary Rhoades, Beyond national states, markets, and sys-
tems of higher education: A glonacal agency heuristic, 43 HIGHER EDUC. 281, 282–83 (2002), available at 
http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/files/hed-2002-marginson-rhoades.pdf (discussing the link between national 
higher education systems and market control). 
 10. See John L. Lahey & Janice C. Griffith, Recent Trends in Higher Education: Accountability, 
Efficiency, Technology, and Governance, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 528, 529 (2002). 
 11. See id. at 529-30; Julie Margetta Morgan, Consumer-Driven Reform of Higher Education: A 
Critical Look at New Amendments to the Higher Education Act, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 531, 532 (2009). 
 12. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Tuition costs of colleges and universities, NCES.ED.GOV, 
http://nces.ed.gov/FastFacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
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The introduction of President Obama’s plan to make college more affordable 
is by no means the first time the federal government has addressed the challenge of 
higher education reform.
13
 In reauthorizing the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 
2008, Congress tried to address the problem of access to higher education while 
simultaneously addressing increasing tuition costs.
14
 The newly revised HEA em-
powered students to make higher education decisions by requiring colleges and 
universities to provide information about admissions, tuition, and loan costs.
15
 The 
“Better Bargain” plan builds on HEA legislation and incorporates reform concepts 
introduced by President Obama in 2012; the new plan will reward colleges and 
students for performance, promote innovations that cut costs and improve educa-
tional quality, and help students repay their loan debts.
16
 
The federal government has always provided financial support for various 
programs in such a way as to further its public policy goals.
17
 When educational 
reform is on the agenda, political goals become closely tied to federal funding.
18
 
While using the power of the federal purse to advocate for higher educational quali-
ty is an allowable exercise of the congressional spending power
19
, there is disa-
greement between educators, politicians, and special interest groups about how 
stronger academic outcomes can actually be achieved.
20
 
The revised HEA’s attempt to drive down tuition costs was unsuccessful.
21
 
The Better Bargain plan is an attempt to achieve cost effectiveness while increasing 
the quality and access of higher education through accountability measures.
22
 
While President Obama’s plan is a step towards educational reform, there appears 
to be strong similarities between the Better Bargain plan and the 2001 No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB)
23
 which attempted to reform K-12 education through im-
posing accountability measures and which was notoriously unsuccessful.
24
 
Both Better Bargain and NCLB are laudable, if optimistic, plans to reform 
education but are unlikely to be successful because they are rooted in politics rather 
than in pedagogy. The Better Bargain plan also makes some unfounded assump-
tions—namely, that the current education model is wasteful and does not prepare 
                                                          
 
 13. Morgan, supra note 11. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 533. 
 16. Here’s the Plan to Make College More Affordable, supra note 4. 
 17. Morgan, supra note 11, at 537. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 20. See Morgan, supra note 11, at 542. 
 21. Judy Hample, Tuition Growth, Educational Access and Public Policy, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/faculty/coll_pres_hample.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).  
 22. Press Release, FACT SHEET on the President’s Plan to Make College More Affordable: A 
Better Bargain for the Middle Class, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/22/fact-sheet-president-s-plan-make-college-more-
affordable-better-bargain- [hereinafter A Better Bargain]. 
 23. See 20 U.S.C.A § 6311(b) (West 2006). 
 24. David Hursh, Exacerbating inequality: the failed promise of the No Child Left Behind Act, 
10 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 295, 295 (2007), available at 
http://www.wou.edu/~girodm/foundations/Hursh.pdf. 
56 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
students for the work force. The plan does not address the crux of the issue—tuition 
rates at public institutions are rising rapidly due the extreme state funding cuts at a 
time when the demand for college placement is greater than ever.
25
 Funding for 
public colleges and universities has not kept pace with growth of college enroll-
ment, especially during the recent recessionary period, which has forced public 
institutions to raise tuition and fees in order to continue to provide services.
26
 
This article addresses the difficulties of imposing accountability measures on 
higher education by drawing parallels between the Better Bargain plan and NCLB. 
Part I will review the history of reforms imposed on elementary and secondary ed-
ucation through the use of federal dollars. Part II will discuss the history of federal 
involvement in higher education, concluding with a discussion of President 
Obama’s proposal. Part III will analyze the problems experienced under NCLB 
prior to its recent reform, and discuss how some of those same challenges are likely 
to play out in higher education if the Better Bargain plan stays in its current form. 
Part IV will discuss possible solutions to the education accountability problem and 
suggest compromises which may need to be made so that it truly benefits institu-
tions, students, and families. 
II. FEDERAL EXPANSION INTO ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION 
Prior to 1950, “the federal government played only a limited role in public 
education,” keeping its contribution to land grants and input into vocational train-
ing while steering clear of general education.
27
 However, in the 1950s the Soviet 
Union launched the first man-made satellite, triggering the creation of the National 
Defense Education Act (NDEA), which provided federal funding to the states to 
teach math, science, and foreign languages in order to achieve defense goals.
28
 Un-
like later federal programs, the NDEA did not contemplate providing training to all 
students; instead, the NDEA targeted talented students and attempted to improve 
the quality of their educations.
29
 
The NDEA was followed by the passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) in 1965, which was the first broad provision of aid for pub-
lic schools. Included in the ESEA was one of its best-known components, Title I, 
which provided specific funding to targeted populations of children living in pov-
erty.
30
 Title I was designed to provide equality in education for poor and underpriv-
ileged students; its main focus was providing funding to the states for remedial 
                                                          
 
 25. Paul E. Lingenfelter, A Critical Juncture for Higher Education in the United States, 
GRAPEVINE (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
http://grapevine.illinoisstate.edu/tables/FY10/A%20Critical%20Juncture%20for%20Higher%20Education
%20in%20the%20United%20States.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Kenneth Jost, Revising No Child Left Behind, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 337, 346 (2010), availa-
ble at http://photo.pds.org:5012/cqresearcher/getpdf.php?id=cqresrre2010041600. 
 28. Id. at 347. 
 29. DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE, 48 
(The Brookings Inst. 1995). 
 30. Jost, supra note 26 at 346. 
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math and reading instruction.
31
 After the passage of the ESEA, standardized testing 
became a part of the American educational experience, as the law required such 
testing by schools receiving Title I funds.
32
 However, Title I frequently fell short in 
closing the gap between poor and wealthy students, and SAT scores sharply de-
clined between 1963 and 1975.
33
 Some educators tied this decline to changes in the 
curriculum; with the rise in the number of non-core subjects taught, such as driver’s 




These rapidly dropping academic scores raised concerns that high schools had 
lowered the achievement bar for students and prompted calls for change.
35
 One 
response to these concerns was the creation of the U.S. Department of Education 
(DOE) in 1979.
36
 This move was initially met with resistance from the Republican 
Party, due to concerns about an expanded federal role in education.
37
 In its initial 
incarnation, the DOE was focused on federal, state, and local cooperation in order 
to provide educational equity for individual students, while at the same time ob-
serving the importance of local control over the education process.
38
 However, the 
publication of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform
39
 in 1983 
became a powerful motivator for increased government involvement in education 
reform.
40
 A Nation at Risk hypothesized that American schools were not doing 
enough to prepare students for the global marketplace where the demand for skilled 
labor was increasing;
41
 it decried the “rising tide of mediocrity,”
42
 which the report 
intimated the then education system was producing.
43
 In the report, American 
schools were charged with under-preparing students for the educational challenges 
ahead; it urged legislators to require more challenging content in schools, raise aca-
demic standards, increase the amount of time students spent in class and on home-
work, and improve teaching quality.
44
 A Nation at Risk galvanized the public, 
drawing interest from a broad range of interested parties; it persuaded several states 
                                                          
 
 31.  See id. 
 32. See RAVITCH, supra note 29 at 47–48. 
 33. Id. at 48–50. 
 34. Id. at 47. 
 35.Id. at 51. 
 36.See D. T. Stallings, A Brief History of the United States Department of Education: 1979-2002, 
CENTER FOR CHILD & FAMILY POL’Y 1, 4 (2002), 
https://www.childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/pdfs/pubpres/BriefHistoryofUS_DOE.pdf. 
 37.  Id. at 4–5. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1983), available at 
http://www.datacenter.spps.org/uploads/sotw_a_nation_at_risk_1983.pdf.  
 40.. See id. at 5. 
 41. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., supra note 39, at 10–12.  
 42. Id. at 9.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See id. at 18–23. 
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By the late 1980s, the concept of federal input into the education reform pro-
cess was well underway, although what role the federal government should take 
was still debated.
46
 The national conversation about education began to reach a 
consensus that greater attention needed to be paid to the academic curriculum and 
to accurately and uniformly measure its success.
47
 As a response to this educational 
crisis, candidates running for presidential office began to make education a greater 
part of their election platforms.
48
 A Nation at Risk was influential in beginning the 
discussion about how to improve American education, and the federal government 
began developing ideas as to how this could best be achieved.
49
 This increased 
commitment to K-12 education was demonstrated by the reauthorization of the 
ESEA in 1986 to include augmented federal support for programs to “benefit eco-
nomically disadvantaged students.” The federal government began moving away 
from enacting legislation which focused on compliance with federal regulations 
and moved towards measuring the academic progress of individual students; this 
shift signaled a continuously expanding federal involvement in education.
50
 How-
ever, this new, improved version of the ESEA required states to develop testing 
standards and to report their scores, but the standards laid out in the legislation 
were only loosely enforced.
51




President George H. W. Bush continued the federal incursion into education 
reform by proposing two education plans during his term in office; legislation was 
proposed which recommended rewarding high-performing teachers and calling for 
national standards and assessments, both of which were rejected by Congress.
53
 
Although his legislation was unsuccessful, President Bush did achieve success in 
gaining the agreement of governors in all fifty states that national standards for 
education were necessary.
54
 However it quickly became apparent that there would 
be political challenges to the development of national standards, as well as difficul-
ty in implementing them fairly and uniformly.
55
 
                                                          
 
 45. Michael Heise, Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and Legalization of 
Educational Policy, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 346 (1994). 
 46. See id. at 353–56. 
 47. See id. at 346–47. 
 48. Stallings, supra note 36, at 5.   
 49. See id. at 346–47. 
 50. Stallings, supra note 36, at 6. 
  51. Andrew Rotherham, A New Partnership, 2 EDUC. NEXT 36, 37–38 (Spring 2002), available 
at http://educationnext.org/files/ednext20021_36.pdf. 
 52. Judith A. Winston, Rural Schools in America: Will No Child Be Left Behind?  The Elusive 
Quest for Equal Educational Opportunities, 82 NEB. L. REV. 190, 204 (2003). 
 53. Kenneth Jost, Revising No Child Left Behind, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 337, 349 (2010), availa-
ble at http://photo.pds.org:5012/cqresearcher/getpdf.php?id=cqresrre2010041600. 
 54. Ravitch, supra note 29, at 57. 
 55. Id. at 57–58 (the goals consisted of agreement regarding: early childhood education; in-
creased high school graduation rates; required demonstrated competency by academic subjects in grade 
four, eight, and twelve; “first in the world” in math and science; and literacy and skills needed to compete in 
a global economy).  
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President Bill Clinton was more successful in his quest for reform than his 
predecessor; under his tenure federal involvement in education grew yet again.
56
 To 
make Title I achieve its promise of extending greater educational benefits to eco-
nomically disadvantaged students, and to encourage states to develop educational 
standards, President Clinton persuaded Congress to adopt a philosophy of stand-
ards-based reform as a template for change in passing both his Goals 2000
57
 educa-
tion package and the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA),
58
 which was the 
reformed, reauthorized ESEA.
59
 Standards-based reform was an educational 
movement which called for curriculum and assessment endeavors to be tied to ob-
jective standards which would be used to measure individual student progress.
60
 
Under the new legislation, states would be required to develop high academic 
standards that would be implemented uniformly by local districts, and measured 
using annual state assessments to see if the standards were being met.
61
 Standard-
based reform was envisioned as leading to improved school quality overall, since 




This shift to standards-based reform changed the basic structure of Title I.
63
 
Rather than focusing on remedial education, the monies advanced from Title I 
funding now had to be devoted to developing high academic standards in reading 
and math, along with development of the accompanying measurement tools.
64
 In 
addition, the states using Title I funding were now required to track and sanction 
schools which failed to increase student achievement.
65
 The 1994 version of the 
ESEA was more successful in its implementation in a way that prior versions were 
not.
66
 By tightening up the requirements for states, Congress gained compliance 
from fourty-nine states, with only Iowa
67
 objecting based on its commitment to an 
educational model which valued local control over state or federal input.
68
 
                                                          
 
 56. See Heise, supra note 45, at 351.  
 57. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 128 (1994) (codified at 20 
U.S.C.A. § 5801 (West 2013)).  
 58. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(a)(1) (West 2013)). 
 59. See Heise, supra note 45, at 356–60. 
 60. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
932, 938 (2004). 
 61. Id. at 939. 
 62. Id. at 938. 
 63. Id. at 938; 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (West 2013).   
 64. Ryan, supra note 57, at 939. 
 65. Id.; 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(b)(1)(A)–(C) (West 2013). 
 66. See Winston, supra note 50, at 203. 
 67. Id. at 204. Iowa later adopted teaching standards to improve student performance and sup-
port local educational goals in 2002. Id. at 204 n.68. It also adopted the “Common Core” standards recently 
required by the Obama administration in order to receive “Race to the Top” grants. Joe Dejka, State Takes 
Closer Look at National Education Standards, OMAHA.COM (Mar. 12, 2013, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.omaha.com/article/20130312/NEWS/703129923/1685. 
 68. Winston, supra note 50, at 204 n.68. 
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The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), which became law in 2002, 
built on the IASA, but raised the stakes for states and ratcheted up federal involve-
ment in the education process to an unprecedented level; it was a sweeping change 
to American educational policy, completely overhauling the ESEA.
69
 Although 
NCLB’s goal was ostensibly equality of education for rich and poor students, the 
NCLB has been wielded as a tool of educational reform, accompanied by an en-
larged federal role in K-12 education.
70
 NCLB was President George W. Bush’s 
first major piece of domestic legislation, and was initially greeted with broad bipar-
tisan support.
71
 Under NCLB, states were required to continue to set high academic 
standards, but additional content areas were added.
72
 In addition, the concept of 
school accountability was taken to an unprecedented level as districts were now 
penalized for failing to meet goals.
73
 NCLB attempted to improve education by 
“closing the achievement gap,”
74
 ensuring equality of education for all children and 
while it was initially heralded as the answer to the challenges posed by the global 
marketplace, it placed a heavy performance burden on educators.
75
 However, ac-




As part of its drive to encourage rigorous academic standards, NCLB expand-
ed the required subjects covered by its mandate and upped the stakes—it added 
science as an additional testing area and required greater accountability from 
schools by requiring increased performance on tests over time.
77
 No longer focused 
solely on remedial instruction for disadvantaged students, instead the goal was bet-
ter measureable outcomes for all students and implementation of policies which 
might lead to this in exchange for funding.
78
 The stated goals of NCLB were: im-
proved education for disadvantaged students improved teaching quality, better lan-
guage instruction for English language learners (ELL’s), more innovative programs 
and informed educational choices for parents.
79
 However, many teachers saw 
NCLB’s main goals as increasing accountability through testing; in the new sys-
tem, test scores would be used to measure individual teacher success, and the pow-
er of federal funding could be used to force changes in curriculum and in the hiring 
                                                          
 
 69. See id. at 205. 
 70. See id. at 204–05. 
 71. Jost, supra note 51, at 347. 
 72.  See Ryan, supra note 57, at 940. 
 73. Winston, supra note 50, at 205. 
  74. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (West 2013)) (“An Act To close the achievement gap with accountability, 
flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind.”). 
 75. Winston, supra note 50, at 205.  
 76. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Signs Landmark No Child Left Behind 
Education Bill (Jan. 8, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020108-1.html.  
 77. Ryan, supra note 57, at 939–40. 
 78. See id. at 939. 
 79. Kimberly A. Murakami, Annotation, Construction and Application of No Child Left Behind 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301 et seq.), 4 A.L.R. FED. 2d 
103 (2005).   
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and retention of teachers.
80
 NCLB held schools accountable for meeting its goals 
through yearly standardized testing, resulting in statistical measurements which 
were then publically reported.
81
 Schools were tested annually in reading and math 




Many of NCLB’s goals were laudable. For example, the law tried to address 
inequities in the educational system by targeting specific subgroups for improve-
ment such as economically disadvantaged students, minority and ethnic groups, 
disabled students, and ELL’s.
83
 NCLB held schools accountable for achievement 
gaps between white students and other students by requiring schools to report indi-
vidual test scores by sub-group, rather than measuring test improvement of the 
school as a whole.
84
 This prevented schools from hiding discrepancies between the 
test scores of white, affluent students and minority or disadvantaged students.
85
 
Unfortunately NCLB was unable to fulfill its early promise. The push for ac-
countability and increased measurement of student success had unanticipated con-
sequences as the role of standardized testing was magnified.
 86
 Under NCLB, stu-
dents were tested at least seven times during their K-12 education,
87
 whereas under 
prior legislation (the IASA) students were examined only three times during the 
course of their school careers.
88
 Testing results under NCLB were used to deter-
mine whether schools were making AYP, a key determinant of continued school 
funding.
89
 AYP looked at the number of students in the school performing at a 
“proficient” level on state tests.
90
 Under NCLB, schools were required to constantly 
improve the academic performance of their students; schools had to increase their 
AYP percentage until 100% of students were scoring at the proficiency level by 
2014,
91
 an impossible goal to meet, especially within a twelve year time period. 
As a result of the push for increased accountability, states began creating their 
own curricula and the corresponding standardized tests; this led to a wide range of 
                                                          
 
 80. Gina Austin, note, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act Usurps 
States’ Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 340 (2005). 
 81. Winston, supra note 50, at 205. 
 82. Id.; see also Ryan, supra note 57, at 955–56. 
 83. See Timeline, 34 C.F.R. § 200.15(a) (2013); Adequate Yearly Progress in General, 34 
C.F.R. § 200.13(b)(7) (2013). 
 84. Ryan, supra note 57, at 944–45. 
 85. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1111(b)(2)(C)(ii), Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 
1425 (2002) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (West 2013)). 
 86. See Thomas F. Risberg, note, National Standards and Tests: The Worst Solution to Ameri-
ca’s Educational Problems . . . Except for All the Others, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 895–05 (2011). 
 87. Ryan, supra note 57, at 938 (NCLB required yearly testing in reading and math in grades 
three through eight, an additional math and reading exam between grades ten and twelve plus science test-
ing three times between grades three and twelve.). 
 88. See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 § 1111(b)(3)(D), Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 
Stat. 3518 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (West 2013)). 
 89. Ryan, supra note 60, at 940. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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standards being created across the country.
92
 In addition to developing their own 
standards and testing structure, under NCLB, for the first time states were required 
to administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reading 
and math test which had previously been an optional assessment.
93
 While one of the 
NCLB’s key goals was to raise the achievement levels of all populations, the ac-
countability testing structure, combined with a financial penalty system, actually 
incentivized some states to lower their education standards in order to boost the 
number of students achieving the desired “proficient” label.
94
 
As part of the quest for proficiency, schools were given benchmarks for suc-
cess and those which could not meet those benchmarks faced a range of penalties 
that ran from minimal to extreme.
95
 After two years of failure to make AYP, 
schools were designated as program improvement schools (PI) and the local school 
district was required to offer students placement at a non-PI school and to develop 
a plan to improve the school within two years.
96
 If the school AYP did not improve 
within the two years, penalties became more severe—options included firing and 
replacing staff, extending the school year, developing a new curriculum, or reor-
ganizing the school as a charter school with new management and staff.
97
 
NCLB was riddled with implementation flaws, almost from its inception. One 
of the biggest flawed assumptions in the law was that every child could achieve the 
desired proficiency level.
98
 While NCLB focused on gradual improvement to stu-
dent proficiency over a twelve year period, the end goal of 100% proficiency was 
problematic. In addition, rather than looking at individual student improvement, the 
act required a series of intermediate improvement levels demonstrated by the 
school as a whole.
99
 Additionally, sub-groups within the schools, such as racial or 
ethnic groups, ELLs and children receiving special education services were re-
quired to meet proficiency targets, without considering the preparation, time, and 
money which would be needed to truly promote rapid learning in those groups in a 
relatively short time period.
100
 The requirement that all students meet a predeter-
mined improved percentage each year was unrealistic without connection to the 
school’s prior history, to its inputs, and to its previous educational preparation of 
students. As a result, many schools were unable to meet their targets, leading to 
either a failure to make adequate yearly progress 
101
 or to shifting standards so that 
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the scoring system worked to their advantage.
102
 Compliance was also challenging 
for schools; to be eligible for federal funding, schools had to comply with each re-
quirement in the thousand-plus page act, requiring increased administrative track-
ing and corresponding increased administrative costs.
103
 
By 2007, when NCLB was up for reauthorization, many voters were disillu-
sioned by the law,
104
 and by 2012, twenty-nine percent of Americans said that the 
law had made the education system worse, while thirty-eight percent believed it 
had made no difference at all.
105
 While the law was written in response to the prob-
lems of its time, and while testing provided insight into how the education process 
could be improved, the law foundered on unintended consequences which weighed 




As President Obama entered office, he was confronted with the responsibility 
of overhauling the law so that it could achieve its goals.
107
 Although a challenging 
task, President Obama was the first president to have access to the data collected by 
NCLB which could be used to improve education.
108
 In response to the implemen-
tation difficulties and flawed outcomes of NCLB, President Obama overhauled the 
law to replace the 100 percent proficiency goal in reading and math by 2014, with a 
goal of preparedness for a college or trade for all high school students by 2020.
109
 
In addition, the revised NCLB continued to require annual testing for accountabil-
ity purposes, but also looked at other measures of success, such as graduation 
rates.
110
 However, the revision kept in place key elements of NCLB which had 
been subjected to criticism—it continued to impose penalties on schools and teach-
                                                                                                                                       
 
fornia schools had PI status. By 2013, the number of PI schools rose to 4,996 and 566 entire schools dis-
tricts also had PI status. In contrast, in 2002, twenty-one percent of schools had an academic performance 
index (API) of 800 and above, while by 2013, fifty-one percent had reached that level). 
 102. John Cronin, Michael Dahlin, Yun Xiang & Donna McCahon , The Accountability Illusion, 
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. 23–24 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.evsd.org/documents/accountability.pdf. 
 103. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1111(a). 
 104. Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 38th Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the 
Public’s Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, 88 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 41, 50–52 (Sept.  2006), available at  
http://www.larrycuban.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/k0609pol.pdf. 
 105. Lydia Saad, No Child Left Behind Rated More Negatively Than Positively, GALLUP 
POLITICS (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156800/no-child-left-behind-rated-negatively-
positively.aspx. 
 106. Ending the ‘Race to the Bottom,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/opinion/12thu1.html?_r=1&. 
107. See David Stout, Obama Outlines Plan for Education Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 
2009), available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/us/politics/11web-educ.html?fta=y. 
108. See generally No Child Left Behind — Overview, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION: FEDERAL 
EDUCATION BUDGET PROJECT (July 1, 2013), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/no-child-
left-behind-overview. 
 109. See id.; Education —Federal Role, CARMEN GROUP INCORPORATED, 
http://www.carmengroup.com/education/federal-role (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 110. Nick Anderson, Obama would scrap ‘No Child’ standard, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-02/news/36818338_1_ayp-school-accountability-system-
achievement-gaps. 
64 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
ers who are unable to increase test scores.
111
 The impact of NCLB was also limited 
by President Obama to cover only the worst-performing schools.
112
 The revision 
also contemplated the adoption of common curriculum standards currently under 
discussion at the state level.
113
 While the changes to the law sounded reasonable in 
comparison to 100% proficiency by 2014, the new changes will in fact be equally 




As a result of the difficulties in implementing NCLB, by 2011 the govern-
ment had plans in place to allow flexibility to the states having difficulty in making 
AYP.
115
 By 2012, the government began granting waivers to meeting some of 
NCLB’s requirements, eventually ending in waivers to struggling schools and dis-
tricts being granted to 41 states and the District of Columbia by the end of 2013.
116
 
These waivers were granted in exchange for commitments by the approved states to 
implement pre-approved plans which included greater academic rigor and better 
outcomes for all students.
117
 In addition, on July 19, 2013, the House passed the 
Student Success Act,
118
 which codified many of these changes and allowed for 
greater flexibility than NCLB. 
To encourage continued K-12 education improvement, President Obama also 
created the Race to the Top (RTT), a $4.35 billion dollar grant to the states which 
took the form of a competition based on more rigorous academic standards, updat-
ed data collection strategies, increased teacher effectiveness and improved low-
performing schools.
119
 The dispersal of the funding was tied to the states’ elimina-
tion of barriers which prevent tying student achievement data to teacher evalua-
tions.
120
 Race to the Top pressured states to change their education laws in response 
to the competition, leading to increased federal influence on the education process 
at the state and local level.
121
 While RTT consisted of one-time funding and was 
                                                          
 
 111. Id.  
 112. Chad Aldeman, President Obama’s Not-So-Secret School Accountability Plan, 
EDUCATIONNEXT (Sept. 3, 2013), http://educationnext.org/ntshabbat-service-requirementsschedule-
options/. 
 113. Jost, supra note 27. 
 114. ROBERT MARANTO & MICHAEL Q. MCSHANE, PRESIDENT OBAMA AND EDUCATION 
REFORM 130 (2012).  
 115. President Obama on No Child Left Behind Flexibility WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 23, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/09/23/president-obama-no-child-left-
behind-flexibility#transcript. 
 116. Cyndi Waite, Afternoon Announcements: Pennsylvania Receives No Child Left Behind Act 
Waiver, ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUCATION (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:07 PM), http://all4ed.org/afternoon-
announcements-pennsylvania-receives-no-child-left-behind-act-waiver/. 
 117. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Elementary and Secondary Education, ESEA Flexibility, ED.GOV 
(Nov. 4, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html. 
 118. Student Success Act, H.R. 3989, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012). 
119. Steve Tarlow, Race to the Top Winners Get $4.35 Billion for School Reform, PERSONAL 
MONEY NETWORK BLOG, (Aug. 24, 2010), http://personalmoneystore.com/moneyblog/race-to-the-top-
winners/. 
 120. Shannon K. McGovern, note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How 
Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1528 (2011).  
 121. See id.  
2014] LEGISLATING HIGHER EDUCATION: APPLYING THE LESSONS OF 




not a perfect approach, it had the desired effect of encouraging the discussion of 
reform and promoted educational innovation.
122
 
By creating RTT and revising NCLB, the federal government had begun to 
link continued funding to the adoption of national academic standards, even though 
the setting of standards has traditionally been within the purview of the states. As 
of May 2013, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had been recipients of 
RTT funds,
123
 which, in addition to the above requirements, also required states to 
approve common standards and assessments; This funding linkage led to fourty-
five states and the District of Columbia adopting common core state standards in 
math and language arts; the federal government skirted the discussion of whether it 
could properly require states to use such standards by relying on the common core 
developed by the National Governors Association and the Council of Chief State 




III. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
As we saw in the prior section, federal input into the K-12 education system 
has increased drastically over the past twenty years, gradually impinging on the 
traditional role states played in forming education policy.
125
 Federal involvement in 
higher education has developed on a parallel track, although on a slightly later 
timeline than at the elementary and secondary school level.
126
 In fact, formal higher 
education predates elementary and secondary education in the U.S., dating back to 
the establishment of Harvard in 1636.
127
 Initially higher education was available to 
the privileged few while the poorer students were funneled into trades, but in the 
1800s there was a movement to make university education available to the working 
classes; this eventually led to the creation of more accessible public universities.
128
 
The first forms of federal involvement in the higher education system took the 
form of land grants and funding to create public institutions.
129
 In addition to land 
grants as a means of promoting higher education, by the early twentieth century, 
federal support to colleges and universities began to be channeled through financial 
                                                          
 
 122. MARANTO & MCSHANE, supra note 110, at 93–96, 109–10. 
 123. Dan Levin, Can the Latest Education Reforms Improve Student Achievement?, CQ PRESS 
(June 15, 2013), 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqr_ht_education_2013#.UmaODZR5NU5. 
 124. Id. (Alaska, Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia have all declined to adopt the common core, 
while Minnesota adopted only the English language-arts standards.).    
125. Neal McCluskey, K-12 Education Subsidies, CATO INST. (May 2009), 
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/education/k-12-education-subsidies. 
 126. Chris Edwards & Neal McCluskey, Higher Education Subsidies, CATO INST. (May 2009), 
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/education/higher-education-subsidies. 
 127. See History of Harvard University, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, http://www.harvard.edu/history. 
 128. Robert Kiener, Future of Public Universities: Can They Compete with New Educational 
Models?, 23 CQ RESEARCHER 53, 66–67 (2013), available at 
http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2357/cqresearcher/getpdf.php?id=cqresrre2013011800. 
 129. See Overview: The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
66 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
aid, which benefitted targeted populations, and research grants, which targeted 
goals of increased technology and national defense.
130
 




It was with the passage of the GI Bill that the federal government’s role in 
higher education began to expand because the bill, which was intended to defer the 
impact of GI reentry into society, covered all college costs for veterans returning 
from World War II.
132
 Almost half of the sixteen million eligible veterans took ad-
vantage of the education benefits, which doubled the number of higher education 
degrees awarded; the number of Americans holding a post-secondary degree 
jumped from 4.6 in 1945 to 10 percent in 1960.
133
 
The Sputnik launch in 1958 impacted higher education just as it had K–12 
education—the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) provided loans for stu-
dents pursuing degrees in math, science, and education, making college more ac-
cessible than ever to lower-income students.
134
 The NDEA was closely followed by 
the passage of the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, which was the first large-
scale legislation to provide federal funding to students and universities.
135
 The HEA 
allowed students to determine which educational institution best fit their needs, and 
then permitted them to attend that school through federal loans, work-study grants, 
and fellowships.
136
 Congress increasingly viewed its role in higher-education policy 
as one dedicated to social equality, and used federal monies to achieve this by mak-
ing HEA loans usable at all eligible institutions.
137
 In subsequent reauthorizations 
of the HEA, the commitment to access of higher education continued; Congress has 
consistently made grants available to lower-income students, and has made them 
available to increasing numbers of middle-class students.
138
 
During the 1980s, public colleges and universities began receiving less fund-
ing from the states due to the conservative push for tax reform, which resulted in 
ever-increasing tuition rates as state dollars dried up.
139
 The public viewpoint of 
higher education shifted from one where education was seen as worth funding be-
cause of the later societal benefits, to a perception that students were benefitting as 
individuals and should therefore bear more of the cost of their educations.
140
 This 
lessened state funding had a direct impact on rising tuition rates, which soon out-
                                                          
 
 130. Morgan, supra note 11, at 538–42. 
 131. Kiener, supra note 128, at 67. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.; THOMAS D. SNYDER, 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 7–8 
(1993), available at http://nces.ed.gov /pubs93/93442.pdf. 
 134. PAMELA EBERT FLATTAU ET AL., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958: 
SELECTED OUTCOMES, at II-1 (2006), available at https://www.ida.org/upload/stpi/pdfs/ida-d-3306.pdf.  
 135. Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and an Assessment, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUC. (Oct. 1995), http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Morgan, supra note 11, at 541–42. 
139. Kiener, supra note 128, at 69. 
 140. Id. 
2014] LEGISLATING HIGHER EDUCATION: APPLYING THE LESSONS OF 




paced the rate of inflation.
141
 In this same decade, the federal government cut the 
amount of student aid available through grants (which do not have to be repaid) and 
shifted to loans.
142
 For example, “in 1980, more than half of [federal] financial aid 
[was] in the form of grants” compared to 2013, where 40 percent of financial aid 
takes the form of loans.
143
 By 2000, the amount of money loaned to students had 
more than doubled.
144
 Compounding the problem was the increasing number of for-
profit colleges and universities, which were also eligible for federal student loan 
money and which may have contributed to driving up tuition costs.
145
 
In addition to concerns about rising tuition, was also the concern that the 
American higher education system was no longer preparing students to compete in 
a global marketplace.
146
 As an increasing number of occupations required a post-
secondary degree, the rank of Americans between twenty-five and thirty-four with 
such degrees slipped from first in 1995 to twelfth in 2012.
147
 Federal lawmakers 
also began to be concerned about the economic impact of students who were less 
prepared for careers in math and science than to their foreign counterparts.
148
 
By 2005, state contributions to their public higher education institutions had 
hit a new low—adjusted for inflation, state spending on higher education was at its 
lowest rate in twenty-five years.
149
 At the same time, increased spending on college 
administration, rather than on teaching, was contributing to higher tuition bills.
150
 
When the HEA was reauthorized in 2008, Congress was faced with reconciling its 
continuing commitment to educational access with rapidly rising costs.
151
 The tim-
ing of the reauthorization, occurring in conjunction with a recessive period in the 
economy, made affordability a key factor in its revision.
152
 These factors led Con-
gress to consider a more consumer-driven approach, which required ever-greater 
accountability on the part of colleges and universities.
153
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In developing new amendments to the HEA, Congress relied to some extent 
on the education issues raised by the National Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education (Commission), written by the Department of Education in 2006.
154
 The 
Commission identified the following as issues for students in seeking higher educa-
tion: access for minority and disadvantaged students, higher tuition costs, lack of 
available information about colleges, decreased state subsidies, and student diffi-
culties in navigating the financial aid system.
155
 The Commission suggested that 
accountability measures, such as had been applied to K-12 education, were the best 
way to solve the issues facing students; it also proposed that the best way to in-
crease accountability was through making more information available to Congress 
and to the public.
156
 
The Commission believed this provision of information would transform 
higher education to meet the country’s needs.
157
 This new consumer model kept the 
decision-making regarding which higher education institution to select with the 
student,
158
 while allowing the federal government to avoid the political hot potato 
of developing uniform measurement tools to determine learning, a concept which 
had met with so much debate in K-12 education,
159
 and which was likely to en-
counter even more criticism at the higher education level.
160
 This model designated 
the consumer as the population best suited to making decisions about college 
choice, once all data was made available
161
—a hypothesis which may or may not 
have been true due to the many different ways students determine value in a higher 
education setting, running the gamut from popularity of sports teams to desirability 
based on social relationships and geography.
162
 
The 2008 reauthorization of the HEA, now called the Higher Education Op-
portunity Act (HEOA), relied on the recommendations of the Department of Edu-
cation report,
163
 and continued congressional financial support of higher educa-
tion,
164
 but increased the accountability level of colleges and universities by requir-
ing them to make additional information available to students.
165
 This information 
included information about college tuition, financial aid, total costs (in addition to 
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tuition) at the institution, student aid and institutional spending, and demographics 
on aid recipients at the college.
166
 Included in HEOA was a provision requiring the 
publication of information about the most expensive institutions in the U.S., as well 
as those institutions which had the largest percentage increases in tuition, along 
with information about which institutions had the lowest tuition and fees.
167
 To 
hold colleges responsible and to drive costs down through public pressure, colleges 
and universities which were in the top five percent for either tuition or net price 
were also required to justify those costs to the Secretary of Education, who then 
had to pass that information on to consumers in a yearly report.
168
 
To make information easily available to students and to ensure truth in adver-
tising on the part of colleges and universities, HEOA required the creation of ac-
countability measures such as the “Net Price Calculator,” which calculated costs for 
first-time, full-time students;
169
 institutions receiving Title IV funds were required 
to post the calculator on their websites by 2011.
170
 This calculator had to be updat-
ed yearly to reflect the most recent tuition and fees so that students were fully in-
formed regarding costs and could make a true comparison between different institu-
tions.
171
 An existing measurement tool, the “College Navigator,”
172
 was also updat-
ed to reflect tuition costs (over the past three years), book costs, total costs, use of 
grants and other financial aid, number of years to graduation, residency, and data 
regarding student populations based on race and ethnicity.
173
 
The HEOA, while aiming at increasing access to higher education and im-
proving higher education overall, relied on the theory that better-informed student 
consumers would pay less for higher education if more information were available 
to them.
174
 The new law also seemed to be aiming at higher education institutions, 
pressuring them to reform their programs and offerings to conform to market prin-
ciples, an idea that had gained traction in recent years.
175
 For example, Rep. George 
Miller (D. Calif.), chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee said, 
“[w]e are redoubling our commitment to college students and parents by reining in 
skyrocketing tuition prices and making our whole system of higher education far 
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 and Representative Buck McKeon saw the refined 
legislation as “empower[ing students] to exert influence on the marketplace.”
177
 
Rather than tying financial aid to attendance at a lower cost for higher value institu-
tion, the HEOA instead seemed to favor a market-based solution where student 
consumers used the information provided to determine which institution best met 
their educational goals.
178
 However, while the provision of information was pro-




The 2008 reauthorization of the HEOA was solidly backed by federal stimu-
lus funds,
180
 and due to the excess money available, the government provided more 
funding for higher education than ever before.
181
 As per-student state funding de-
creased, the federal government has increasingly assured access to higher education 
through dispersal of financial aid.
182
 However, as tuition rates continued to rise, one 
culprit was increasing administrative costs.
183
 While student-to-faculty ratios have 
remained relatively stable, since 1975, the administrator-to-student ratio has risen 
drastically.
184
 Faculty ratios tend to rise in proportion to increases in the number of 
students, while administrative ratios have outpaced that measure.
185
 Administrators 
and staff now outnumber faculty members on campus—an interesting use of funds 
when we consider the role of higher education is teaching students, rather than 
managing them.
186
 While the number of full-time faculty has dropped so that today 
50 percent of faculty members only work part-time, the number of full-time admin-
istrators and staff has increased.
187
 The salaries of these non-contributing parties 
has risen as well—since 1995 instructional spending has increased by 128 percent, 
while administrative spending has increased by 235 percent.
188
 
In 2013, federal intervention in higher education has continued to follow the 
model of K-12 education reform through the creation of a post-secondary innova-
tion contest, which encouraged colleges and universities to make changes that 
would boost graduation rates and student outcomes.
189
 Colleges which responded 
quickly to the call for innovation will be eligible to compete for grants from the 
                                                          
 
 176. Doug Lederman, House, Focusing on Cost, Approves Higher Education Act, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Feb. 8, 2008), 
 http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/08/hea#ixzz2etcAoUSC.    
 177. Morgan, supra note 11, at 534.  
 178. Id. at 547–48. 
 179. C. BOARD, supra note 141 (In 2009-2010, there was a 9.5 percent increase in tuition at state 
higher education institutions, although it was followed by smaller increases in subsequent years.). 
 180. Morgan, supra note 11, at 551. 
 181. C. BOARD, supra note 141. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Ginsberg, supra note 150. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Letter from Thomas K. Lindsay, Dir. of the Ctr. for Higher Educ., to Dan Branch, Chairman, 
House of the Higher Educ. Comm. (Mar. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/handouts/C2902013032014001/aec38986-b2fb-45a0-a757-
65d53ce25fad.PDF.  
 189. Morgan, supra note 11, at 549–50. 
2014] LEGISLATING HIGHER EDUCATION: APPLYING THE LESSONS OF 




Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education,
190
 or “First in the World” 
funding.
191
 This one-time $260 million dollar allocation rewards schools that use 
innovative learning models to enhance teaching and learning.
192
 
Under President Obama, there has been increasing support for regulating 
higher education to serve the dual purposes of access and economic stability while 
promoting competition between institutions.
193
 The two tools that the federal gov-
ernment seems poised to wield to achieve these goals are accountability and market 
forces.
194
 While traditionally accountability in higher education consisted of ac-
counting for how federal funds were spent, increasingly, accountability has come to 
mean conformity with federal expectations about how the money should be spent 
without looking too closely at educational outcomes gained by students.
195
 In high-
er education, students have been put into the driver’s seat as they become consum-
ers of the higher education product.
196
 As federal dollars are increasingly support-
ing higher education, there is a greater call for demonstrating the dollar value of a 
degree.
197
 As higher earnings have consistently been correlated with a college de-
gree, students and their parents in their new roles as consumers increasingly want 
to see job data from their institutions.
198
 
The accountability principle in combination with the student consumer model 
has become increasingly problematic.
199
 While Congress and students expect high-
er education to provide “quality educational opportunities,” such terms are difficult 
to quantify given the broad range of programs available and the difficulty in meas-
uring the “value” students gain as a result of that quality education.
200
 This is where 
President Obama’s most recent proposal for higher education steps in—it appears 
from the plan’s layout that the White House is attempting to define these difficult 
terms and creating metrics to measure such terms as “quality” and “success.”
201
 
As part of his first term, President Obama instituted student loan reform and 
focused on making college more accessible to disadvantaged or minority students 
through tax credits and increased Pell grant funding.
202
 Following his successful 
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run for a second term, President Obama’s focus appears to be shifting toward re-
quiring colleges to provide “good value” in order to keep their federal funding.
203
 
In the 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama proposed sweeping 
changes to the higher education system in the United States, which have now come 
to fruition in his 2013 proposed Better Bargain plan.
204
 The 2012 proposal was 
based on three central tenets: encouraging colleges and universities to lower tuition 
by rewarding them with additional financial aid, creating an improved education 
model by rewarding education reform and achievement, and asking Congress to 
keep higher education accessible through low financial aid interest rates, increased 
work study funds and educational tax credits.
205
 All of these principles are now 
incorporated in additional detail in President Obama’s 2013 plan to make college a 
more affordable, better bargain for the middle class.
206
 
A. The Better Bargain Plan 
The Better Bargain plan was revealed to the public on August 22, 2013, build-
ing upon already existing legislation and requiring greater collegiate accountability 
and efficiency, as well as increased use of technology and innovative teaching 
methods.
207
 In addition, the Better Bargain plan strengthens existing government 
tools like the College Calculator, and introduces a ranking system for higher educa-
tion institutions—tuition, policies and programs will all be ranked by the Depart-
ment of Education and will be used to determine the extent of federal funding for 
institutions.
208
 Connecting college rankings to funding is likely to have a big impact 
on how higher education does business in the future.
209
 
The federal government currently swings a large hammer when it comes to 
determining educational policy.
210
 It dedicates over $150 billion each year to finan-
cial aid; in comparison, the states provide less than half that amount of funding—
only $70 billion in state funding to public colleges and universities.
211
 While the 
White House has said that it will not determine college choice for students, it has 
also stated that tax dollars will be “steered” towards institutions that score high on 
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the ratings scorecard by providing value and performance,
212
 which will certainly 
determine whether many students will choose to attend universities where federal 
dollars cannot be used.
213
 This will give the federal government the opportunity to 
reform higher education to create its more globally competitive workforce.
214
 
The first facet of the White House Better Bargain plan involves rewarding 
colleges and students for their performance.
215
 This section of the new policy in-
volves the creation of a college ratings system by the Department of 
tion.
216
Although the ratings system is in development and will not be available until 
2015,
217
 it will likely be based on the College Scorecard, which measures cost of 
education, graduation rates and time to completion, student loan default rates, the 
median borrowing rate, monthly loan repayment costs, and student employment 
after graduation.
218
 The new system will add to those factors: student access, cost 
and outcome measures such as graduation rates, earnings, and whether students go 
on to earn advanced degrees.
219
 Colleges will be given some time to improve their 
ratings—although the system is supposed to be complete by 2015, student aid will 
not be dependent on the institution’s ranking until 2018.
220
 
The new ratings system is supposed to group colleges according to mission in 
order to ensure fairness.
221
 However, the White House is encouraging states to 
change the way they fund their own colleges and universities and to create their 
own reward and penalty systems to reward high performing institutions and penal-
ize institutions that do not improve performance.
222
 Also, to encourage colleges to 
serve lower income students, the plan proposes payment of bonuses to the colleges 
based on the number of Pell grant students they graduate.
223
 
In addition to improving higher education through increased information and 
ratings, the White House is providing additional funding to carry out its vision for 
change through programs such as Race to the Top: College Affordability and Com-
pletion (RTTC).
224
 This program is similar to the K-12 version and will reward 
states which undertake systemic reforms to improve quality, affordability, and effi-
ciency.
225
 States that fund their institutions based on success measured by the num-
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ber of graduating students and who institute value-added programs such as acceler-
ated learning modules and greater collaboration between high schools and higher 
education institutions will also be eligible for RTTC funding.
226
 
In addition to state and institutional accountability, the White House plan 
holds students accountable for making progress towards earning a degree by using 
financial aid to encourage student graduation rate improvement.
227
 This involves 
overhauling the current system where students receive aid based on credit hour 
enrollment; under the new plan, students who do not complete a certain percentage 
of their enrolled courses would not be eligible for future financial aid.
228
 The plan 
also seeks to get more value for Pell dollars by gradually disbursing payments over 
a period of months, rather than providing the full amount at the beginning of the 
semester to students who may not complete their coursework.
229
 
A second major factor in the Better Bargain plan is rooted in the idea that 
technology has the answers to some of the problems plaguing higher education and 
driving up costs.
230
 The White House believes that investing in technology will 
allow higher education to drive down costs while preserving quality and has part-
nered with business and community leaders to get input into how technology can 
provide better teaching and learning.
231
 It points to the success of Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOC’s) as an innovative tool which can serve a large number of 
students at very little cost.
232
 
In addition to using technology to lower costs and to increase delivery, the 
White House plan also calls for two innovative measures which would reduce the 
amount of time a student spends in college.
233
 The first is the use of competency-
based measures over what it calls “seat time.”
234
 This proposed learning model 
would abolish the traditional sixteen week semester and allow students to move on 
to new courses as soon as they have mastered the basic principles of the class.
235
 
The second measure calls for prior-learning recognition, where students are award-
ed credit for skills they have already mastered; this would involve additional pre-
college testing along with high school/college collaboration so that students can 
receive dual credits before enrolling in college.
236
 
The final piece of the Better Bargain plan secures the federal government’s 
interest in access to higher education for students by keeping lending costs 
low.
237
While prior repayment plans required the borrower to repay all monies owed 
                                                          
 
 226. A Better Bargain, supra note 18. 
 227.  Id. 
 228. See id.  
 229. Id. 
 230.  Id. 
 231. Id. See also Jeffery R. Young, A Conversation With Bill Gates About the Future of Higher 
Education, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (June 25, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/A-
Conversation-With-Bill-Gates/132591/ (The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has been one such voice, 
advocating for “flipped” classrooms where students view lectures online and use class time for projects).   
 232. A Better Bargain, supra note 18. 
 233.  Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
2014] LEGISLATING HIGHER EDUCATION: APPLYING THE LESSONS OF 




to the federal government, the new plan will allow all borrowers who are eligible to 
pay a percentage of what they earn, rather than the full loan amount.
238
 This pro-
posal would cap payments at 10% of each borrower’s monthly income.
239
 This plan 
was previously available to some students—approximately 6% of the total number 
of present student loan borrowers,
240
which worked out to “2.5 million of 37 million 




Continued financing of higher education may be challenging given the current 
federal financial picture. One challenge is that after implementing the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) there may not be much funding left over to implement higher edu-
cation reform.
242
 The Obama administration has actually spent slightly less on edu-
cation than preceeding administrations, if we omit the stimulus dollars coming 
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
243
 Since that money was a 
one-time investment, it is highly unlikely that spending will continue at the same 




As an additional financial challenge, the proposed reforms to higher education 
are driven, in part, by the $7 billion shortfall faced by the Pell Grant system.
245
 As 
Pell grants serve Obama’s identified high-risk populations (poverty and low-
income students), the money will have to come from somewhere or fewer poor 
students will have access to education.
246
 Given the financial situation and goal of 
higher academic achievement, transforming higher education at lower funding lev-
els will require the administration to apply the lessons learned from NCLB to the 
Better Bargain plan. 
IV. LESSONS OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THEIR APPLICABILITY 
TO THE BETTER BARGAIN PLAN 
The President’s plan has many factors in common with the No Child Left Be-
hind Act (NCLB).
247
 Most notably, NCLB required increased accountability, en-
couraged technology use, and rewarded high performing schools financially, all 
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features of the current Better Bargain plan.
248
 In fact, the only piece on the higher 
education reform plan that differs in principle from K-12 reform is the loan repay-
ment section.
249
 However, the Better Bargain plan is also susceptible to the same 
implementation challenges and unanticipated outcomes of NCLB, where schools 
with high-income, white students were rewarded and schools with low-income, 
disadvantaged students were penalized.
250
 This section of the paper will discuss the 
challenges exposed by NCLB and discuss how the Obama administration can tailor 
its higher education plan to avoid the same negative outcomes. 
One of the problems President Obama may face in implementing his new 
higher education plan has to do with seeking support. While President Obama has 
said that he seeks input from educators into the reform process, in actuality, this 
new plan was developed without such inputs
251
, leading many to question whether 
the administration sees a lack of competence on the part of higher education to con-
tribute to the new plan, or whether it plans to increasingly rely on the business 
community for input into reform. However, while there is some value to gaining 
input from all interested parties, applying a business model to education is prob-
lematic. 
A. The Federal Power to “Reform” Higher Education is Limited by State 
Sovereignty 
Congress’ tool for education reform is its Spending Power.
252
 Congress’ con-
ditional spending power is based on the notion that states are able to contract with 
the federal government—the state receives funding in exchange for its agreement to 
abide by federal guidelines.
253
 When exercising the spending power, the federal 
government must comply with four requirements: (1) the legislation must be in 
pursuit of the general welfare of the United States; (2) the condition must be unam-
biguous; (3) the money must be related to a federal interest; and (4) the condition 
cannot conflict with any other constitutional provisions.
254
 In determining whether 
the spending power is being used properly, the Supreme Court also considers the 
persuasive powers of the federal purse, stating that the funds cannot be used so 
“coercive[ly]” that the pressure to conform becomes compulsory.
255
 Congress may 
only use the spending power to serve a federal interest in education, which theoreti-




As states maintain their sovereign roles regarding education, Congress lacks 
the power to regulate education on its own; however, in recent years the federal 
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government has made increasing incursions into academic control.
257
 The U. S. 
Department of Education at its creation recognized the role that the states played in 
forming their own education policies, and was barred from exercising “direction, 
supervision, or control over the curriculum;”
258
 instead, its role was to encourage 
state development of quality programs and to ensure educational access for disad-
vantaged children.
259
 While today the U.S. Department of Education sees its role 
“as a kind of ‘emergency response system,’ a means of filling gaps in State and 
local support for education when critical national needs arise,”
260
 in fact, the federal 
government plays a huge role in forming state education policies.
261
 
Although the power to develop curriculum and assessment tools rests with the 
states, both NCLB and the White House Better Bargain plan create conditions un-
der which schools must make changes to both curriculum and assessment in order 
to qualify for federal funding.
262
 The federal government currently funds approxi-
mately 10.8 percent of K-12 education,
263
 and provides funding through grants, 
work-study funds, and student loans to approximately fifteen million higher educa-
tion students.
264
 The real question becomes whether state autonomy can be pre-
served given the implications for schools, which reject the conditions tied to federal 
funding. Schools build their budgets around the provision of federal funds;
265
 at-
taching new conditions to the money has a trickle-down effect on curriculum and 
teaching. Federal funds play such a huge role in the overall education budget, that 
states and higher education institutions are in no position to refuse any funding 
conditions, no matter how unattractive or counterproductive they may be. 
Thus, federal funding acts as a lever for policy change. Using the congres-
sional spending power, the NCLB Act, and other acts like it, are enforced against 
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While states are not given a pre-determined federal curriculum, which each 
state must implement, under NCLB, states were required to improve proficiency in 
math, language arts, and science.
267
 This lead to curriculum changes in K-12 
schools, as those subjects were emphasized; more time was devoted to those aca-
demic areas to prepare students for eventual examination.
268
 While it is unclear 
which subjects the Better Bargain plan will propose measuring to hold higher edu-
cation institutions accountable, funding conditions are likely to attach, at the very 
least, in the areas of math, technology, and science
269
 as these would help achieve 
the federal policy goals of increased preparation to compete in a global market-
place
270




Accountability, as envisioned by the federal government, may require states 
to shift their laws to emphasize some academic subjects and minimize others as 
what happened under NCLB.
272
 In addition, as discussed above, setting high ac-
countability standards may lessen access for disadvantaged students, unless the 
statute is narrowly tailored so as not to penalize institutions that serve a large popu-
lation of disadvantaged students.
273
 Otherwise, institutions such as community col-
leges, which were established with an open access mission, would either be driven 
out of business or would have to shift their missions to accept students who had 
already demonstrated ability to perform well on standardized tests. 
B. Education Reform is a Political Process which May Lead To Inconsistency 
While it is relatively simple for everyone to agree that we could do a better 
job of educating students in the U.S., it is much more difficult to reach concurrence 
about how to improve the education process and how to measure that achievement. 
While there is beginning to be bipartisan support for national standards and as-
sessments at the K-12 level as seen by the adoption of the “common core,”
274
 and 
while there is some movement towards similar assessments at the university level, 
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parties disagree about how to best develop such tools.
275
 For example, there may be 
a broad definition of what words such as “competency” mean, even among educa-
tors.
276
 In addition, deciding how states might be held accountable and what form 
that accountability might take is also problematic.
277
 When these conversations take 
place at the national level and where parties are negotiating in ill-defined areas, the 




Political parties have always played a role in determining what types of re-
form are appropriate for education based on policy goals.
279
 For example, Republi-
cans have traditionally opposed federal involvement in education, which has made 
them resistant to some reform proposals.
280
 Democrats, on the other hand, generally 
support more federal involvement in education in order to guarantee access to edu-
cation by minorities and poor students.
281
 These disagreements tend to result in 
education bills which are cobbled together to serve the interests of both political 
parties, and often do not reflect a uniform plan for improvement, but rather bits and 
pieces which somehow managed to survive the legislative process.
282
 
It is also important to recognize that requiring accountability puts power in 
the hands of those calling for it, and highlights the low status teachers’ hold in our 
society
283
. The very notion of reform seems based on the perception that schools 
and administrators require motivation in order to improve the quality of education 
offered to students, and infers that absent rewards and penalties, students will not 
succeed.
284
 The very wording of the Better Bargain plan hints at accounting to a 
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higher authority, which is better able to determine success or failure.
285
 Accounta-
bility also depersonalizes the value a teacher brings to the classroom, since every-
thing depends on the school’s overall achievement on the test.
286
 
While different special interest groups may agree on the need for one set of 
national standards, there is much greater resistance to the idea of a national curricu-
lum, which would be designed by a federal bureaucracy
287
, especially at the college 
level. Deciding that some classes or subjects are more important than others
288
, 
would likely lead to lobbying at the national level by special interest groups to get 
additional classes included in their categories of interest. Many different parties in 
addition to teachers and administrators would be motivated to lobby for their inter-
ests; this might include technology platforms, software developers, textbook pub-
lishers, and many others who would benefit from having their products adopted.
289
 
Deciding whether a student is competent in an academic area is also rife with pos-
sibilities for disagreement.
290
 The first difficulty arises in deciding the level at 
which the student is deemed competent,
291




In addition to the above concerns, the decision to revoke or limit the funding 
of a higher education institution cannot be done in a vacuum. Legislators must take 
into account that the children of their constituents may attend that school, and the 
failure to provide funding may result in a lower quality of education or denial of 
access for students desiring to matriculate at that school. Legislators may be equal-
ly vested in preserving funding for their own alma maters. Finally no legislator will 
want to be on the record as the one whose vote destroyed a college or university in 
his or her own state. 
C. Standardized Testing Diminishes the Democratic Process 
One serious side effect of developing tools for uniform assessment is the lack 
of input required from interested voters once that tool is completed and implement-
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 291.  See supra text accompanying note 273. 
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http://www.corestandards.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (States who 
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 The attempt to legislate what should be learned by students and then hold 
schools accountable based on those regulations, whether at a local school or at a 
public university, removes the possibility of community input.
294
 Shifting education 
towards federal standards takes the responsibility for determining the quality of 
education away from locally elected school boards, and puts it into federal hands.
295
 
It prevents local districts from commenting on or tailoring the curriculum to the 
needs of their particular communities.
296
 Setting standards is always elitist because 
it eliminates the participation of all parties and typically limits input to experts, 
chosen by those appointed to lead the process.
297
 If all conversations regarding cur-
riculum and the testing process begin to take place at the federal level, it will be-
come impossible for individually interested parties (such as parents and students) to 
compete with larger foundations and special interest groups.
298
 This may not be in 
the best interest of students, as a community-involved institution may have better 
buy-in and better outcomes.
299
 
By their very nature, academic standards limit participation in the political 
process. Once accountability standards have been determined, all conversations 
regarding the school must then revolve around whether those standards have been 
met; once the time for discussion has passed (whether you were an invited partici-
pant or not) there is no ability to criticize or amend the standards themselves.
300
 By 
their very nature, standards of accountability, once implemented, deter creativity in 
the classroom and prevent teachers from teaching to top students, as all curriculum 
decisions must be driven by the test.
301
 Adoption of uniform standards also makes it 
difficult for interested parties to see additional possibilities—to look outside the 
box for solutions, since we’re all, by virtue of regulation, inside the box.
302
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In addition to limiting the democratic process once standards have been de-
veloped, there are other faults in federal regulation of higher education. For exam-
ple, while the new College Scorecard system seems like an innovative tool which 
will benefit education, the downside of such a tool is that its creation will neither 
require input from Congress, nor voters, as the Department of Education has been 
tasked with its development; this puts the allocation of federal dollars to preferred 
schools firmly in the hands of the administrative branch, and does not allow input 
into what elements should be incorporated into the College Scorecard, nor does it 
address how those elements should be weighted.
303
 
Standards which address only academic issues also have the potential to 
preempt other valuable learning goals that we may have for education. For exam-
ple, in K-12 education and in higher education, society has goals for schools which 
exceed math, science and reading skills.
304
 We rely on schools to teach students 
social skills, ethics, citizenship, and a whole host of values.
305
 At the collegiate 
level, goals may include development of independence, becoming a valuable mem-
ber of society, responsibility, and service to the community.
306
 However, when core 
academic standards are adopted, these secondary goals necessarily become dis-




D. Accountability Leads to Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic Populations 
One of the benefits of NCLB was that the law forced schools to track the per-
formance of students based on racial or ethnic characteristics.
308
 No longer could 
schools hide the lower performance of disadvantaged groups inside the overall 
school population.
309
 However, eleven years after the introduction of NCLB, it was 
obvious that schools had failed to close the achievement gap for these sub-
groups.
310
 For example, African-American and Latino students still lagged behind 
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While states are invested in the goal of raising proficiency levels of English 
Language Learners (ELL’s), in reality this goal has been difficult to achieve, re-
gardless of legislation and the amount of federal funding available.
312
 One culprit in 
this dilemma—ELL’s are particularly vulnerable to the challenges of standardized 
testing which has been embraced as the tool of accountability.
313
 ELL’s score con-
sistently low on standardized tests which measure academic achievement and 
course content knowledge.
314
 For example, in 2011, eighth-grade ELL students 
scored forty percent lower than their native English speaking counterparts in read-
ing;
315
 this continues a pattern of low scores for ELL’s which NCLB did nothing to 




When considering the needs of ELL’s, the amount of time a school has to en-
act improvements becomes key;
317
 for example, we must consider whether is it fair 
to expect the improvement for this sub-group using the same timeline that is used 
for more advantaged sub-groups.
318
 One of the goals of NCLB was to move stu-
dents towards English proficiency as soon as possible, a goal which failed to con-
sider the difficulty in mastering a foreign language in a short time period,
319
 which 
then led to school failure to make AYP for that sub-group.
320
 
In addition to the challenges in improving education for ELL’s, under NCLB, 
more disadvantaged students were enrolled in Title I schools, the very schools 
which were vulnerable to AYP penalties.
321
 As the percentage of required “profi-
cient” students increased, the number of schools designated as program improve-
ment (PI) schools increased.
322
 For example, in 2002 at the beginning of NCLB, 
1,200 California Title I schools were designated as PI schools.
323
 By 2013, the 
number of California Title I schools with the designated PI label had risen to 4,996 
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out of 6,135 total Title I schools in the state.
324
 As the percentage required to meet 
AYP rose, the PI designation was applied to entire school districts—566 California 
districts were PI districts in 2013.
325
 This is troubling, as under NCLB, the PI label 




The truth is that Title I schools serve a population which needs varied educa-
tional supports.
327
 Determining that a school is subject to AYP penalties may en-
courage top teachers to move to other institutions with lower risk in order to keep 
their jobs.
328
 Also, designating a school as a PI school may directly harm students 
and their parents based on the belief that students in the school are not as intelligent 
as their non-PI counterparts.
329
 Students who come from disadvantaged back-
grounds usually have less support and less early childhood preparation than stu-
dents from more affluent backgrounds.
330
 Students with greater socioeconomic 
challenges tend to test lower on exams as shown by the inverse relationship be-




The disservice done to disadvantaged students goes beyond the failure to im-
prove test scores. In schools where minority and poor students are located, ac-
countability and testing becomes the core curriculum, rather than learning enrich-
ment.
332
 In-class reading and extra assignments all fall by the wayside in the push 
to prepare for the standardized exam at the end of the year.
333
 This leads to greater 
inequity in the education process, as wealthier schools are able to provide contin-
ued enrichment opportunities that are denied to their poorer counterparts.
334
 Test-
driven accountability hides inequalities in education, as high test scores in minority 
schools are taken as representative of a high-achieving school, while learning may 
in fact be limited to test preparation.
335
 This may lead poorer districts to invest their 
funds in materials and activities that raise scores, rather than in materials and activi-
ties that provide long term growth for students.
336
 At the college level, this may 
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lead to either curricular changes, or to limiting the enrollment pool.
337
 Since Black 
and Latino sub-groups tend to receive lower scores on standardized tests, any 




Beyond the challenges to student sub-groups with racial, ethnic, or socioeco-
nomic barriers to education, lies the challenge of using a standardized test to deter-
mine the learning of a special education child.
339
 While special education students 
have a broad range of disabilities, from physical challenges to mental difficulties, 
under NCLB the special education sub-groups were required to improve their pro-
ficiency levels at the same rate as other school sub-groups.
340
 This change to educa-
tion for special needs children signaled a shift in how such students were assessed; 
while it held the school accountable for the increasing progress of special education 
kids, it was problematic, as special education typically focused on the individual 
needs of a particular child, rather than on the school’s accountability for teaching 
academic subjects.
341
 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
342
 
aims at creating high individual academic expectations for students with disabili-
ties.
343
 However, the creation of NCLB, which sets minimal testing benchmarks as 
a measure for success, moves away from the idea of individual needs and towards 
uniformity.
344
 The scenarios for many special needs children is this: the focus is on 
life skills and vocational training to prepare them for life after graduation.
345
 This is 
a result that most parents seek and approve.
346
 However, NCLB mandates a one-
size-fits-all model of education, in which all children are college bound.
347
 It also 
fails to take into account the learning challenges which individual special needs 
children may have.
348
 While a special needs child may be promoted with his or her 
class, he or she may be continuing to work on what would be remedial skills for 
others of the same age.
349
 The undue influence given to standardized testing results 
may result in ostracism for the child and may limit college access for students with 
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disabilities coming out of high school, in an effort to keep the higher education 
institution ranked high, which conflicts with the mission of many community col-
leges which fill the gap for disabled students.
350
 
Applying NCLB-like accountabilities for disadvantaged students in higher 
education may have a chilling effect on the number of universities willing to accept 
students who may jeopardize their test scores and thus deprive them of student loan 
funds.
351
 There is already a competitive market for diverse students who score high 
on college entry exams.
352
 The universities who lose that competition may be reluc-
tant to accept diverse students who cannot demonstrate a level of competence, 
which is predictive of future success.
353
 This competition for dollars, through tried 
and true accountability measures, may create a category of colleges, which are in 
essence Title I schools, with fewer opportunities available to students and with the 
bulk of class time spent on test preparation. 
E. Higher Education is Not a Competitive Free Market 
In the ideal free market system, price is influenced by the principles of supply 
and demand.
354
 However, a true free market system rests on several fundamental 
tenets that do not exist in higher education.
355
 For example, free markets presume 
that no seller can exert influence over market prices, that identical products are 
offered by each seller, that products are portable, and that the buyer has full 
knowledge of alternative products and pricing.
356
 However, free market models 
when applied to higher education fail to account for less tangible factors such as 
family tradition, geographical location (a recognized predictor of which college a 
student will attend), and the availability of a wide range of options in the area: 
community colleges, private colleges, private universities, online universities, and 
public colleges.
357
 Student “buyers” must also consider the difference between in-
state and out-of-state fees;
358
 other factors such as sports teams, arts programs, and 
exclusivity play a role in school choice as well.
359
 Using a free market model also 
makes assumptions about students, which may not be borne out in practice; for 
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example, it assumes students have the ability to travel between schools, which may 
not be true.
360
 Also, given the shift the higher education system is currently experi-
encing toward non-traditional student models, the free market models fail to take 
into account that many community college students select institutions based on 
family needs and full time work schedules.
361
 Such students may be less concerned 
about whether nearby schools rank low in quality and more concerned about avail-
ability of night and weekend classes. The free market model ignores individual 
student needs and focuses on a one-size-fits-all formula.
362
 
It is also faulty to assume that colleges are competing based on price; instead 
colleges compete over qualified students, who are themselves inputs which drive 
institutional success.
363
 Colleges are selling enrollment slots, rather than an educa-
tional product.
364
 However enrollment space is not uniform from institution to insti-
tution; it is based on factors such as student qualifications, institutional mission, 
and faculty quality.
365
 Further disrupting the vision of higher education as a free 
market is the fact that many institutions are not completely dependent on tuition 
revenues; many have the freedom to set their own prices, due to access to different 
resources such as endowments, operating costs, and state funding.
366
 Federal finan-
cial aid is only one source of revenue.
367
 Thus, the regulation of higher education in 




There is also some discussion by economists as to whether the existence of 
federal student loans is itself the cause of inflated tuition rates.
369
 The very availa-
bility of a continuous stream of funding may be influencing the higher education 
market.
370
 Experts in market forces suggest that if the federal government is truly 
invested in lowering tuition rates, it should decrease the amount of student financial 
aid available, which would then drive down tuition costs.
371
 
In discussing his plans for higher education, President Obama is resting his 
proposal on a human capital theory—that investing in education will result in 
greater human capital, leading to greater economic advantage in the global market-
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place, an assumption that connects education to U.S. economic stability.
372
 While 
this seems like a reasonable hypothesis, there is little real data to support it.
373
 This 
hypothesis also fails to consider the difficulties in comparing test scores between 
nations.
374
 The other difficulty with the human capital theory lies in its assumption 
that the value of education is connected to earning capability—erasing the goal of 
“life-long learning” and replacing it with one of “life-long earning.”
375
 
NCLB attempted to apply market-like influences to K-12 education by 
providing choices to parents.
376
 Under NCLB, parents had the option to exit schools 
designated as program improvement schools and “transfer their children to better 
performing schools.”
377
 This was intended to force schools with diminishing stu-
dent populations to improve.
378
 However, it is difficult to determine whether the 
option of choice influenced overall school improvement.
379
 Some studies have 
shown that when parents were provided with adequate information regarding 
school choice, they selected higher performing schools that increased their child’s 
standardized test scores,
380
 but there is minimal data available on this point.
 
The Better Bargain plan rests on the assumption that students will actually 
seek out the information contained in the updated College Navigator, and use it to 
make better education decisions.
381
 It is unclear whether students will do so,
382
 as 
the current College Navigator seems to have stalled in its attempts to lower costs 
through increased information.
383
 By refining the College Navigator to include in-
formation beyond basic college characteristics, which would allow students to look 
at the value added by the institution, such as job placement information and as-
sessments of the institution’s academic quality, the White House is attempting to 




One item of concern about the use of market forces to create change is the 
impact that Better Bargain will have on institutional mission—will society continue 
to see higher education as providing a well-rounded body of knowledge and skills 
in which the student makes choices about his or her preferred field of study, or will 
they come to be seen as job preparation factories? As education is increasingly seen 
as a commodity, we are moving towards a model that is outcome driven, rather 
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than focused on education for its own sake.
385
 Using such a model may move us 
towards correct resource allocation by the college, rather than by driving down 
overall costs; monies may be focused on profitable career tracks, rather than on 
challenging disciplines that appear to have lower entering salaries.
386
 Paul Gibbs 
observes that such a shift may affect both students and faculty.
387
 The student im-
plications revolve around completing courses, rather than learning, which might 
then result in less student preparation, lower contact hours, unchallenging assess-
ments, and improper self-assessment.
388
 Meanwhile, faculty implications include 
increasingly heavy academic workloads as the institution shifts its focus and fund-
ing to job placement, rather than in-depth, rigorous education.
389
 
All of the above issues are implicated by the Better Bargain plan as it shifts 
funding towards minimal competencies rather than high quality learning. For ex-
ample, the suggestion that institutions minimize seat time seems less likely to in-
crease teaching time and more likely to shift learning onto the student who will be 
responsible for achieving minimal competency in an area as measured by a series 
of multiple choice tests.
390
 The same challenge is posed by requiring core compe-
tencies of students before they can move on to subjects; such models rest on 
achieving a minimal level of learning, rather than teaching to the highest level. 
F. No Uniformity Means No Accountability 
One of the biggest critiques of NCLB was that by leaving the creation of 
measurement tools up to states, states were given the opportunity to construe the 
standards to benefit their schools without making any major changes.
391
 The goal 
that schools had to meet under NCLB was “proficiency,” which was undefined in 
the act.
392
 In giving states wide latitude to interpret or determine the meaning of 
proficiency, the federal government opened the door to inconsistency, and thus 
disparate measurement results.
393
 For example, one study found that a school re-
ceiving an 80% proficiency rate in Wisconsin, would receive a 52% proficiency 
rate in Massachusetts and a 19% proficiency rate in California using the same 
test.
394
 Not only that, but this feature of NCLB made it difficult to measure differ-
ent programs offered at different schools on a state-to-state basis.
395
 It became im-
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possible to make consistent judgments about schools in different states, even when 
trying to group them for fairness.
396
 
G. Using Testing to Impose Accountability is a Flawed Model 
One of the key difficulties states faced in implementing NCLB was whether 
or not a standardized test was the most accurate measurement of learning.
397
 A 
learning environment that relied on testing as the only model to assess learning 
created a culture of “teaching to the test,” rather than an educational environment 




The NCLB was flawed in its execution. Many educators leveled relevant cri-
tiques at the law, which punished districts rather than rewarding them.
399
 While 
NCLB was well-intentioned, its implementation caused the decline of educational 
standards in some states.
400
 Since the measurement tool for accountability was in-
creasing test scores and very little else, the temptation for schools to adjust the nu-
merical meaning of a “passing” score was irresistible.
401
 For example, some states 
lowered their standards to reduce the risk of failing to comply with NCLB’s im-
provement guidelines and others came up with strategies to discourage lower per-
formers, such as special education students, from taking the test at all.
402
 
Testing and accountability come to be one and the same in a federal ranking 
system.
403
 In a setting where testing is the driver of success, the core curriculum 
becomes a test prep class,
 404
 rather than the innovative learning space envisioned 
by the Better Bargain plan. Teachers who would prefer not to teach to the test 
(those who want to design their own rich curricula and who love teaching) may be 
diverted into non-core subjects to avoid teaching test prep.
405
 In addition, so long as 
states design their own testing instruments and their own standards of success (or 
“proficiency” in the case of NCLB), the system is flawed—it becomes difficult to 
draw parallels between various state institutions to determine quality.
 
Accountability measures led to unequal results in the application of NCLB.
406
 
In some states, a failing school might meet or exceed the standards of the state next 
door, where that hypothetical school would be deemed a success.
407
 Whether at a 
K-12 school or a university, an institution’s qualification for funding should not 
depend on geographical location. When different states create laws to gain access 
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to federal funds, their different approaches prevent us from seeing whether educa-
tional improvement is truly occurring.
408
 
As states could vary their standards and approach under NCLB,
409
 difficulties 
arose based on the different ways in which states determined “[t]he difficulty of the 
proficiency cut score,” “[t]he proportion of students required to reach the proficien-
cy cut score” (called annual measureable objective), minimum n sizes (“[t]he min-
imum number of students required for a subgroup to be included” as a separate 
AYP measure), and the application of confidence intervals which are typically used 
to correct for sampling errors, but which are inappropriately used in testing where 
nearly the entire school population is tested.
410
 These inconsistencies in testing ap-
proaches led to outcomes where in one state, a school made AYP and in another it 
received a failing grade and was destined for program improvement.
411
 
As in NCLB, under the Better Bargain plan, states will have the latitude to 
develop both their standards for improvement and their measurement tools.
412
 
While NCLB required 100% improvement or categorization of all students as “pro-
ficient” by all states by 2014,in reality, states determined what “proficient” truly 
meant in terms of math and language skills.
413
 Using Better Bargain, some states 
will interpret their standards loosely and others will interpret them rigorously, lead-
ing to an unequal result—increased funding for some and lost funding for others.
414
 
In addition, states will have the leeway to determine whether smaller racial, ethnic 
or economically disadvantaged groups must be measured as individual catego-
ries.
415
 This gives states the freedom to decide whether to lump all students together 
for a higher overall improvement rating.
416
 
The ability to measure one higher education institution against another using 
non-uniform testing measures will be even more challenging than comparing K-12 
school districts. Even if the administration is successful in grouping institutions 
according to mission
417
, there will still be a broad range of required courses, teach-
ing styles and learning outcomes, let alone differences in academic qualifications 
depending on which major a student selects, which will make it difficult to use test-
ing to rank colleges and determine funding eligibility. These testing difficulties 
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may lead to the impression of accountability, rather than the reality of it.
418
 Com-
bining increased testing pressure with the corresponding drive to lower costs as 
currently proposed by the Better Bargain plan
419
, will likely create a situation in 
which colleges will be tempted to change their grading systems and lower their cut 
scores to improve their reported test scores against their competitors.
420
 
If the Better Bargain plan seeks to eventually impose uniform testing on the 
states, (which it currently disavows) it may cause some of the same problems faced 
by NCLB. For example, if the Better Bargain plan were to require a constant rate of 
improvement as measured by percentage of students enrolled, eventually those tar-
gets would become difficult to meet. While initially improvement might be easy to 
show (especially if the state sets its own opening benchmark), as benchmarks rise it 
will become more difficult to meet them. If the goal is 100% proficiency or im-
provement as with NCLB,
421
 eventually we will likely be left with a pool of stu-
dents who cannot progress or who are becoming more difficult to educate and 
therefore will be denied access to higher education. 
The push for ever-greater achievement in testing may also limit student access 
to the highest ranked educational institutions. Unlike K-12 education, where school 
districts must include all students living within their geographical boundaries,
422
 
there are no such restraints on higher education. Higher education institutions typi-
cally have the absolute discretion to determine admission requirements
423
 (with the 
exception of community colleges which have a different mission in most states). It 
may become desirable for these schools to close their enrollment pool to English 
language learners (ELL’s) and other disadvantaged groups. The unpalatable truth is 
that disadvantaged students do not test well.
424
 A system which rewards students 
from prosperous backgrounds who typically do well on standardized tests is rela-
tively low risk for the institution involved.
425
 The end result of this drive for ac-
countability through testing is that schools that are serious about serving minority 
and poor students may be penalized for their inability to constantly improve test 
scores, which would deny them access to federal funds, eventually resulting in a 
change in mission.
426
 This may also drive innovative professors away from minori-
ty-serving institutions and steer them towards their more stable counterparts. The 
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reduction of an individual student to a number, rather than to a complex personality 
with a wide range of both needs and talents, is dehumanizing to the student.
 
A lack of definition in testing will create myriad problems in measuring learn-
ing outcomes in higher education.
427
 For a start, similarities between programs will 
be difficult to quantify.
428
 Additionally, while there is likely some general agree-
ment as to what skills constitute a quality education program in the K–12 arena, 
moving into university education with a broad range of majors, schools can justify 
different education approaches and goals quite easily.
429
 There is certainly more 
than one way to design a quality program—for example, one might rely more on 
hands-on learning, while the other relies on a flipped classroom.
430
 There could be 
solid pedagogical reasons for each approach, and reasonable people could disagree 
as to which is the correct approach when both lead to positive outcomes.
431
 
There are additional flaws in using a testing and tuition cost model as the 
measure of accountability. One such flaw is the failure to take into account the dif-
ferences between K–12 education, which is mandatory, and higher education, 
which is not.
432
 There are no attendance mechanisms available in higher education 
as we are educating adults who are presumed to be responsible for their own ac-
tions.
433
 There are no penalties for the failure to show up for class, which colleges 
could then use to alleviate the problem of unmotivated students.
434
 While a testing 
model might be more workable with the captive audience in K–12 education, it 
seems manifestly unfair to penalize colleges for enrolling students with poor per-
sonal management skills and then requiring them to police those students. Such a 
policy may lead to institutions dropping students who perform poorly in the begin-
ning of the semester in order to avoid poor test performance later on and would 
penalize students who may need a little time to absorb the main concepts of the 
class. 
The question of when to test is an additional issue created in using assessment 
to determine success in higher education.
435
 For example, NCLB required profi-
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ciency testing in all grades 3–8, plus one high school grade.
436
 Thoughtful consid-
eration may lead us to the determination that this type of testing model is flawed, as 
it closely scrutinized lower grade levels and failed to measure educational quality in 
the upper grades where improvement and achievement become the most important 
as students prepare to apply for college. However, the K–12 model is able to look 
at a student population over a period of years.
437
 This is less true in higher educa-
tion, where institutions aim to have students graduate within four years.
438
 The log-
ical conclusion of this is that students tested in the first and second year of higher 
education may be successful because of strong K–12 instruction, rather than the 
instruction they are receiving at university. This limits accurate assessment to the 
final two years of a student’s matriculation, a very narrow window upon which to 
base improvement. 
Colleges and universities also have a revolving door for enrollment, which 
makes it difficult to assess improvement with any accuracy.
439
 The truth is that 
higher education institutions don’t have a static population.
440
 They graduate stu-
dents every year, and new ones enroll.
441
 There is also a great deal of movement 
within the enrolled population, as students leave for work and internships, only to 
return several semesters later.
442
 Students also transfer from one institution to an-
other, and sometimes students leave higher education for a wide variety of reasons 
having very little to do with the quality of education, such as family commitments, 
work opportunities, and lack of interest.
443
 This poses testing challenges, as most 
schools are working with a varied group of students rather than one group that con-
tinues from beginning to end and achieves a degree within a four-year period.
444
 It 
is also difficult to truly measure the quality and effectiveness of instruction based 
on the testing results.
445
 For example, testing outcomes are also determined by 
classroom composition.
446
 There are many contributors to academic achievement 
and teaching quality is just one.
447
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H. Innovation is Both a Problem and a Solution 
The White House plans to increase innovation in higher education through 
making statistical data on college performance available publically.
448
 It is doubtful 
whether this approach will truly increase innovation or whether it will increase the 
appearance of such innovation. It also plans to offer colleges “regulatory flexibility 
to innovate,”
449
 (something higher education already has.) However, the idea that 
innovation, especially using new technologies, could be used to lower costs and 
increase effectiveness is an attractive proposition.
450
 
This transformation of education through technology is already underway.
451
 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC’s) are the harbingers of change as they cre-
ate an open access portal to students around the world.
452
 As college attendance 
shifts from traditional student enrollment to a non-traditional model, technology 
and innovation are poised to become key components to making education accessi-
ble to a varied student demographic.
453
 Higher education has always been drawn to 
innovation as part of teaching skills to make students marketable.
454
 However, 
technology generally has had a limited impact on how courses are designed and 
delivered.
455
 For example, even though many colleges now offer online courses, 
they are compartmentalized in the same way the brick and mortar course would 
be.
456
 There is also a stigma attached to attendance at a fully online or less tradi-
tional institution, even though that institution may have more freedom to inno-
vate.
457
 Because most traditional institutions are already vested in their models, 
both K-12 and higher education typically see the new technology as adding value to 
what already exists, rather than as an opportunity for total innovation.
458
 
President Obama’s discussion of competency-based models, as proposed in 
the Better Bargain plan, is one way to encourage innovation.
459
 Currently, student 
learning is measured by credit hour, which is the amount of time a student spends 
attending a traditional course.
460
 A competency-based model looks at desired com-
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petencies and then provides students with the course materials and assessments to 
meet those competencies.
461
 Another innovation, which is frequently mentioned in 
connection with lowering costs, is the idea of “unbundling” services so that stu-
dents only pay for services which they use.
462
 To take unbundling to its logical 
conclusion, courses would become transferable across institutions and the institu-
tions would become increasingly specialized.
463
 Courses themselves could be bro-
ken down further into smaller units which students could complete.
464
 
The Better Bargain proposal to increase innovation also has disadvantages; it 
would basically take traditional education and put it online.
465
 Online learning nec-
essarily requires less human contact and the ability to meet individually with pro-
fessors and form mentorships is diminished.
466
 Also, the MOOC model currently is 
not widely operated for college credit
467
—providing formative feedback in such 
massive courses would require a lot of human capital, unless grading were limited 
to multiple choice testing.
468
 The technology required to power innovation may also 
be costly.
469
 While we embrace today’s technology as a solution to many of the 
problems in higher education, in reality, colleges would have to invest and reinvest 
given the rapidity of development.
470
 Also, while technology reduces costs as fewer 
professors are needed to teach students, it ignores the reality that a key factor in 
increasing cost of tuition for students has more to do with lower state financial con-
tributions and exploding administrative costs, than with professor salaries.
471
 
V. BETTER BARGAIN REFORM IDEAS 
The first thing the administration should do is to determine its goals. This 
means starting a national conversation on what a “good” school is before assess-
ment begins. As with teaching in the K–12 setting, goals should be designed before 
changing the current structure. The federal government needs to determine whether 
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it wants to ensure access for all students, whether it wants an overall better educa-
tion system, whether it wants a more innovative use of technology in teaching or 
whether it wants tuition rates to drop. While more than one goal can be operative at 
a time, not all of these goals are mutually compatible. For example if we want bet-
ter teaching, which most agree can be achieved through smaller class sizes, spend-
ing may increase.
472
 Also, the administration needs to consider how accountability 
will be achieved. While in the case of NCLB this was done through standardized 
multiple choice testing,
473
 that model failed to consider the totality of the goals of 
education.
474
 Increased availability of information seems unlikely to make higher 
education accountable either. True assessment and eventual accountability can only 
be achieved by using multiple measures of success, and by using more assessment 
measures than multiple choice.
475
 
True reform involves starting over and looking at cause and effect, rather than 
making changes to laws that were not effective the first time around.
476
 This means 
we cannot assume that adding innovative technologies and mandating change to 
invested institutions (and their equally invested accrediting bodies) in return for 
funding will achieve the desired goals.
477
 For example, Andrew Kelly and Freder-
ick Hess hypothesize that true change in education will be determined by “disrup-
tive innovation” as implemented by those outside the traditional academy, rather 
than by those who are vested in the current model.
478
 They argue that the govern-
ment needs to be open to funding avant-garde, non-traditional models which are not 
yet accredited in order to transform higher education, rather than just adding some 
technological components to the traditional model.
479
 
Regardless of agreement on academic standards and assessment, improve-
ment should be measured over time, rather than from year-to-year. Focusing on 
rates of growth, rather than aiming for a consistently improved, pre-determined test 
result from year to year, will provide incentive for growth, while still looking at 
whether the institution is setting and achieving high goals.
480
 Part of this new as-
sessment should look at individual student improvement, rather than at having a 
critical mass of students achieve a proficiency-like level. A change to the NCLB 
model would most likely lead to more meaningful outcomes for disadvantaged stu-
dents and would prevent the imposition of unfair penalties on institutions which 
serve large populations of such students.
481
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Reforming education requires recognition that administrators and professors 
care about student achievement and its corresponding corollary—in higher educa-
tion, students are adults, and therefore much of their success rests on them as indi-
viduals. The trend towards accountability for both K–12 and higher education often 
seems based on the assumption that teachers are not doing their best—that teaching 
staff require either incentives or penalties in order to work hard. It also assumes 
that students are stymied in their efforts to gain an education and are handed a sub-
standard education product. Both of these assumptions are flawed—professors need 
to be included in the development of any plan which would change curricula and 
testing while students would also need to be held to greater accountability stand-
ards than the gradual payment of Pell grants over the course of a semester. 
An unpalatable admission must be made by state and federal education re-
formers—not everyone in the United States will get the best education possible.
482
 
This is a hard pill to swallow since we like to believe that equal access can lead to 
equal learning opportunity.
483
 However, we all know that different institutions pro-
vide vastly different educational experiences, different opportunities for growth, 
and different influential alumni networks which may or may not aid students after 
graduation. In addition, students must qualify for these top educational experiences 
based on the choices they and their families make in grades 9-12.
484
 Learning op-
portunities are also dependent on student choices: whether to stay at a local com-
munity college, whether to have children early which may make it difficult to grad-
uate in four years, whether to go away to a traditional ivy league school, and 
whether the student wishes to take on student loan debt. All the federal government 
can really do for students is to provide them with access to higher education of 
some type. 
Discussions on reform also need to begin with whether the traditional college 
model is actually broken. Student higher education opportunity is in large part 
based on student preparation in the elementary and secondary education system.
485
 
We often say that inputs drive outputs. It may not be possible for higher education 
to make up for the learning gaps which students have coming out of high school. 
For example, if a student entering college is required to enroll in remedial mathe-





While the reform of higher education may be a daunting task, it is not entirely 
unachievable. If the administration carefully considers the history of federal educa-
tion reform and closely examines it role in the education process, the desired goals 
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may yet be achieved. As part of the drafting process, the lessons learned from 
NCLB should be carefully considered, along with the challenges that may arise 
through applying new accountability standards to a different educational system. 
